mirror of
https://github.com/MengMengCode/VoCat.git
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MengMengCode
688e1e8311
- Added MaxLogEvents constant to enforce a hard limit on stored log events. - Updated AppendLogEvent to discard older logs when the limit is exceeded. - Enhanced ListLogEvents to support filtering by log level and excluding specific messages. - Introduced ClearLogEvents method to permanently remove logs and prevent re-queuing of cleared entries. - Modified LogRetentionCard component to reflect the new log retention settings and limits. - Added logging categories for better organization and filtering in the UI. - Implemented sanitization for sensitive information in logs. - Added tests for log event limits and clearing functionality.
101 lines
2.9 KiB
Go
101 lines
2.9 KiB
Go
package server
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import (
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"context"
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"log/slog"
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"net"
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"net/http"
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"strings"
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"time"
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"vocat/internal/store"
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)
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// recordAudit writes one security-relevant event to the audit trail. Failures
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// are logged but never block the request being audited.
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func (s *Server) recordAudit(
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ctx context.Context,
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actor string,
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action string,
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entityType string,
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entityID string,
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outcome string,
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remoteAddr string,
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) {
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level := slog.LevelInfo
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if !strings.EqualFold(strings.TrimSpace(outcome), "success") {
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level = slog.LevelWarn
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}
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if s.logger != nil {
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s.logger.Log(ctx, level, "user operation",
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"category", auditLogCategory(action),
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"event", action,
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"actor", actor,
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"entity_type", entityType,
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"entity_id", entityID,
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"outcome", outcome,
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)
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}
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if s.store == nil {
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return
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}
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_, err := s.store.AppendAuditEvent(ctx, store.AuditEvent{
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Actor: actor,
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Action: action,
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EntityType: entityType,
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EntityID: entityID,
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Outcome: outcome,
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RemoteAddr: remoteAddr,
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CreatedAt: time.Now().UTC(),
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})
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if err != nil {
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s.logger.Warn("write audit event failed", "category", "system", "action", action, "raw_error", err)
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}
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}
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func auditLogCategory(action string) string {
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action = strings.ToLower(strings.TrimSpace(action))
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switch {
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case strings.Contains(action, ".sms") || strings.HasPrefix(action, "sms."):
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return "sms"
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case strings.Contains(action, ".call") || strings.HasPrefix(action, "call."):
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return "call"
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case strings.Contains(action, "vowifi") || strings.Contains(action, "ims"):
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return "vowifi"
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case strings.Contains(action, "device") || strings.Contains(action, "esim") ||
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strings.Contains(action, ".at.") || strings.Contains(action, ".ussd"):
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return "hardware"
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default:
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return "operation"
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}
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}
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// audit records an event for an already-authenticated request, resolving the
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// actor from the session and the source address from the raw connection (proxy
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// headers are deliberately not trusted for the audit trail).
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func (s *Server) audit(r *http.Request, action string, entityType string, entityID string, outcome string) {
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actor := ""
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if s.auth != nil {
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if cookie, err := r.Cookie(sessionCookieName); err == nil && cookie.Value != "" {
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if session, authErr := s.auth.Authenticate(r.Context(), cookie.Value); authErr == nil {
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actor = session.Principal.Username
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}
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}
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}
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s.recordAudit(r.Context(), actor, action, entityType, entityID, outcome, requestRemoteHost(r))
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}
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// auditAuth records an authentication event where no session exists yet (the
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// actor is the username that was attempted).
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func (s *Server) auditAuth(r *http.Request, username string, outcome string) {
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s.recordAudit(r.Context(), username, "auth.login", "session", username, outcome, requestRemoteHost(r))
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}
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func requestRemoteHost(r *http.Request) string {
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host, _, err := net.SplitHostPort(strings.TrimSpace(r.RemoteAddr))
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if err != nil {
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return strings.TrimSpace(r.RemoteAddr)
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}
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return host
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}
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