Merge pull request #625 from sebastiondev/fix/cwe918-fetchres-server-837c

fix(fetchRes): prevent SSRF in server-side URL proxy

functions/api/fetchRes.js

@@ -4,6 +4,58 @@
  */
 import { dualAuthCheck } from '../utils/auth/dualAuth.js';
 
+/**
+ * Determine whether a hostname refers to a private, loopback, link-local,
+ * cloud-metadata, or otherwise internal network address. Used to prevent
+ * SSRF against internal services from the proxy endpoint.
+ *
+ * @param {string} hostname - hostname or IP literal from a parsed URL
+ * @returns {boolean}
+ */
+function isPrivateHostname(hostname) {
+    if (!hostname) return true;
+    let h = hostname.toLowerCase();
+    // Strip IPv6 brackets
+    if (h.startsWith('[') && h.endsWith(']')) {
+        h = h.slice(1, -1);
+    }
+
+    // Obvious local names
+    if (h === 'localhost' || h === 'ip6-localhost' || h === 'ip6-loopback') return true;
+    if (h.endsWith('.localhost') || h.endsWith('.local') || h.endsWith('.internal')) return true;
+
+    // Cloud metadata service hostnames
+    if (h === 'metadata.google.internal' || h === 'metadata.goog') return true;
+
+    // IPv4 literal check
+    const ipv4 = h.match(/^(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})\.(\d{1,3})$/);
+    if (ipv4) {
+        const [a, b] = [parseInt(ipv4[1], 10), parseInt(ipv4[2], 10)];
+        if (a === 10) return true;                              // 10.0.0.0/8
+        if (a === 127) return true;                             // loopback
+        if (a === 0) return true;                               // 0.0.0.0/8
+        if (a === 169 && b === 254) return true;                // link-local / AWS metadata 169.254.169.254
+        if (a === 172 && b >= 16 && b <= 31) return true;       // 172.16.0.0/12
+        if (a === 192 && b === 168) return true;                // 192.168.0.0/16
+        if (a === 100 && b >= 64 && b <= 127) return true;      // CGNAT 100.64.0.0/10
+        if (a >= 224) return true;                              // multicast / reserved
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    // IPv6 literal check (basic)
+    if (h.includes(':')) {
+        if (h === '::' || h === '::1') return true;
+        if (h.startsWith('fe80:') || h.startsWith('fe80::')) return true;   // link-local
+        if (h.startsWith('fc') || h.startsWith('fd')) return true;          // unique local fc00::/7
+        // IPv4-mapped IPv6 (::ffff:a.b.c.d)
+        const mapped = h.match(/^::ffff:(\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3})$/);
+        if (mapped) return isPrivateHostname(mapped[1]);
+        return false;
+    }
+
+    return false;
+}
+
 export async function onRequest(context) {
     // 获取请求体中URL的内容
     const {
@@ -30,9 +82,63 @@ export async function onRequest(context) {
     if (targetUrl === undefined) {
         return new Response('URL is required', { status: 400 })
     }
-    const response = await fetch(targetUrl);
+
+    // Validate the target URL to mitigate SSRF (CWE-918).
+    let parsed;
+    try {
+        parsed = new URL(targetUrl);
+    } catch (e) {
+        return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: 'Invalid URL' }), {
+            status: 400,
+            headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' }
+        });
+    }
+
+    // Only allow http(s); block file:, gopher:, data:, ftp:, blob:, etc.
+    if (parsed.protocol !== 'http:' && parsed.protocol !== 'https:') {
+        return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: 'Only http(s) URLs are allowed' }), {
+            status: 400,
+            headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' }
+        });
+    }
+
+    // Refuse embedded credentials (used to smuggle auth into internal targets).
+    if (parsed.username || parsed.password) {
+        return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: 'Credentials in URL are not allowed' }), {
+            status: 400,
+            headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' }
+        });
+    }
+
+    // Block private / loopback / link-local / metadata targets.
+    if (isPrivateHostname(parsed.hostname)) {
+        return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: 'Access to internal addresses is not allowed' }), {
+            status: 400,
+            headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' }
+        });
+    }
+
+    // Follow redirects manually so a permitted host cannot redirect us onto
+    // an internal address without re-validation.
+    let response = await fetch(parsed.toString(), { redirect: 'manual' });
+    let hops = 0;
+    while (response.status >= 300 && response.status < 400 && response.headers.get('location') && hops < 5) {
+        const next = new URL(response.headers.get('location'), parsed);
+        if ((next.protocol !== 'http:' && next.protocol !== 'https:') ||
+            next.username || next.password ||
+            isPrivateHostname(next.hostname)) {
+            return new Response(JSON.stringify({ error: 'Redirect to disallowed target' }), {
+                status: 400,
+                headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' }
+            });
+        }
+        response = await fetch(next.toString(), { redirect: 'manual' });
+        hops++;
+    }
+
     const headers = new Headers(response.headers);
     return new Response(response.body, {
-        headers: headers
+        headers: headers,
+        status: response.status
     })
 }